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THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: VOL. 4, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-

64. By Carl B. Swisher.' New York and London: MacMillan
Publishing Co., Inc. 1974. Pp. xvii, 1041.
2
Reviewed by Mark V. Tushnet

The time has come to blow the whistle on the Holmes Devise History of
The Supreme Court. Paul Freund is a great constitutional scholar and an
inspiring teachers but the three volumes of the history that have appeared to
date show that he has not done the job that the general editor of the series
should have done. 4 This volume by Carl Swisher on the Taney Period
illustrates the problems with the collection, and Professor Freund's default is
most readily apparent because the principal author died six years before the
volume was published.
That Swisher's work is out-of-date is Professor Freund's responsibility; he
ought to have appointed a new author to complete the work. That the work
is basically misconceived is the joint responsibility of the author and the
editor. The study of American legal history has flourished in the past
decade. We now have an increased appreciation of the relationships between intellectual current, technical concerns, economic developments, and
American law. It is, therefore, especially disappointing that the major history
of the Supreme Court is turning out to be a traditional political history of the
Court. In effect, Swisher has done little more than merely expand, to great
length, Charles Warren's chapters on the Taney Court.5 Indeed, this work
bears no indication that it was published in the 1970's rather than the
6
1950's.
1. Carl B. Swisher, now deceased, was Thomas P. Stran Professor of Political

Science at Johns Hopkins University during the preparation of this work.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.

B.A.,

1967, Harvard

University; J.D., 1971, Yale Law School.
3. Indeed, as a personal note, it was as a result of Professor Freund's undergraduate
course that I decided to attend law school.
4. The other two volumes, C. FAIRMAN, 6 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
HISTORY

OF

THE

SUPREME

COURT

OF

THE

REUNION 1864-88 (1971), and J. GOEBEL, JR.,
HISTORY

OF

THE

SUPREME

COURT

OF

UNITED

STATES:

RECONSTRUCTION

AND

1 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE

THE

UNITED

STATES:

ANTECEDENTS AND

BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971), were both published in 1971.
5.

See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1-357 (rev.

ed. 1937).
6. It is significant that no more than 10 of the bibliography's 400 entries bear
publication dates later than 1960 and, of these, none are periodical publications.
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Swisher's somewhat dated political approach is revealed in the very
structure of nearly every chapter. Each begins with a brief sketch of the
political background of the issue to be addressed; Swisher relies heavily on
the private correspondence of the Justices, especially that of Justice Catron,
who, among a bench of Justices acutely sensitive to national politics,
apparently maintained the most active contact with political leaders. Despite the seeming narrowness of his sources, however, Swisher does present
an accurate, though abbreviated, account of the political context of the Court's
cases. He then presents uniformly lucid summaries of the facts of the cases,
followed by rather long-winded condensations of the Court's opinions. He
concludes with contemporaneous evaluations of the decisions, drawn from
leading newspapers identified by their political affiliations (e.g., pp. 120,
129), and from prominent politicians. This pattern is broken only with
regard to Dred Scott v. Sandford;7 here, Swisher devotes a full chapter to the
"aftermath" (pp. 631-52).
This structure is most effective in the quarter of the book that is devoted
to the slavery controversy (pp. 528-713), which, on the level of the national
government at least, was primarily a political dispute. Swisher's account of
the Court's activities during this period is adequate though unimaginative.
Here, as elsewhere, the book relies on judgments about the antebellum
period that had become settled by the late 1950's, and that have become
rather less settled since then.
Swisher's exhaustive research in private papers serves him well when he
turns to anecdotal sketches of the Justices, prominent attorneys, and the
business of the Court and its bar. Indeed, perhaps the best sustained essay
in the book is the chapter on "The Judges and the Circuits" (pp. 248-74), in
which Swisher discusses the work of the Justices as Circuit Judges, the harsh
living conditions that circuit riding imposed on the Justices, and the political
8
implications of proposals to alter the circuit system.
Undoubtedly, there are strengths in a political history of the Supreme
Court during this era, but they are not enough to support a work of 1,000
pages. Swisher's problems are of two sorts. First, he relies almost exclusively on contemporaneous evaluations of the Court's activities; thus, he does
not assess the long-term meaning of the decisions, nor does he place them in
a broad enough context. Second, Swisher's interpretations are, without
major exception, purely political: he is concerned solely with the meaning of
the decisions in terms of the conflict between states' rights and nationalist
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8. For another discussion of this facet of the Court during the same era, see S.
KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 48-63 (1968).
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views of the federal system, and even more narrowly, between Democrats
and Whigs (e.g., pp. 405-06). The effort to force every interpretation into
this dichotomy leads to grave inadequacies.
For example, in his chapter on land claims from newly settled areas,
Swisher begins by stating:
One group [of the Justices] put emphasis on the sanctity of alleged grants, and the other on the right of settlers to acquire possession [sic; probably "title"] by entering upon unoccupied lands
under the preemption laws of the federal government. .

.

. [T]he

group leaning toward the rights of settlers included Chief Justice
Taney and Justices Catron, Daniel, Nelson, and Woodbury, while
the group more preoccupied with the rights of'claimants under alleged grants included Justices McLean, Wayne, McKinley, and
Grier. .

.

. The divisions, although of course involving points of

law, reflected views of public policy regarding the nation's land heritage (p. 748).
This quotation illustrates three intertwined defects in Swisher's approach.
First, and least important, it shows his attempt to group the Justices into
two opposing factions. This personalization of the conflict is misleading in light of the fact that the Justices were substantially in agreement
on many issues of public land policy. 9 Second, it illustrates Swisher's
pervading effort to refrain from synthesis of apparently opposing views into a
coherent set of ranked policies.' 0 Yet, as Willard Hurst's work in the field
of state law (for roughly the same period) has shown, one can discover, by a
full and fair consideration of all the available material and not just those
cases that present interesting anecdotes, priorities in public policy about the
disposal and use of land."- The third defect shown by the quotation is the
offhand manner Swisher employs when mentioning public policies other than
states' rights and nationalism. As incredible as it may seem, nowhere in the
60 pages dealing with land cases that follow the above quotation does Swisher
explicate in any greater detail what really were the "views about public policy
regarding the nation's land heritage." This failure to attend to a context
broader than a political party struggle, is the book's most serious defect.
9. As Swisher himself admits, "Many [of the Louisiana and Florida land cases]
were decided unanimously." (p. 748).
10. Another example of this trait can be found in the chapter entitled "Admiralty and
Maritime Jurisdiction" (pp. 423-56), in which it was stated that the Court's decisions
"with respect to admiralty jurisdiction followed a meandering course ....
[marked by
a] pattern of inconsistencies" (p. 455).
11. J.W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LuMBER
INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1865-1915 (1964).
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Before examining the flaws induced by Swisher's narrow focus, it is worth
mentioning another example of Swisher's reliance on dichotomy rather than
synthesis. In discussing the sequels to Swift v. Tyson, 12 Swisher touches
briefly on the role of corporations. He writes:
It is to be remembered that during the 1840s and 1850s the people
alternated between approval of aid to private corporations

. . .

and

hostility to corporations which failed to do all that was expected
of them or proved to be the enemies rather than the friends of the
investing public (p. 335).
The concept of an alteration of attitudes is not helpful in this context, and
indeed, Swisher's own phrasing suggests that public attitudes, while not
simply for or against corporations, were fairly coherent. I mention this
example not because the discussion that it introduces stands out in the book,
but precisely because the discussion is too typically structured in an unnecessarily polarized manner.
Swisher's presentation of the material on corporations is typical in another
way. It seems fair to say that the primary issues facing the Taney Court, at
least until the mid-1850's were a blend of the political and the economic.
The Court had to develop doctrines that would promote investment and
growth without unduly hindering states from experimenting, at a time when
experiments were plainly valuable, with alternative mechanisms for the
promotion and control of economic growth. Clearly, the Court's cases did
present a conflict between doctrines that would allow states wide latitude in
regulating business and those that would impose stringent constitutional
limitations on such regulations, making necessary an analysis that implicates
questions of federalism. But a full analysis would also recognize that
questions of economics-or, more precisely, questions about what Americans
thought their economy should do--must also be addressed.
One example of this failure to take a broad view is found in an account of
the Taney Court's cases which established the rule that corporations are, for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, citizens of the state of incorporation
(pp. 457-70). To understand those cases it is important to know how
many corporations had multistate directorates, how substantial prejudices
were (and the fears of prejudices, directed particularly against out-of-state
corporations), and how important investors would consider variations between local law and the federal law available under Swift v. Tyson. Perhaps
the answers to all of these questions would cancel one another out, leaving
only the purely political component as worth exploring, but I am reluctant to
accept that on faith.
12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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Admiralty jurisdiction was also expanded under the Taney Court to include
the inland waters for the first time (pp. 423-56). It would certainly expand
one's understanding to know the extent, if any, to which substantive admiralty law favored investments in river transport over the various state laws
which otherwise would have been applicable. Swift v. Tyson looms in the
background here too, for an alternative to expanding the admiralty jurisdiction was to adopt the substantive content of admiralty law as the general
federal common law applicable in diversity cases. The closest Swisher
comes to mentioning these questions is his concluding paragraph of the
chapter:
The development of admiralty must be seen in light of the growth
of the United States as a major commercial and industrial power.
Expanded jurisdiction in admiralty during the Taney period made
sense in the light of beliefs about our national destiny, as did the
expansion of the commerce power in later decades (p. 456).
The statement is of course superficial, but, even more, it is stylistically a
throwaway, serving not to summarize but only to introduce a new topic.
Perhaps the most glaring instance in which the narrowness of Swisher's
political interpretation is quite costly is his presentation of The Proprietorsof
the Charles River Bridge v. The Proprietorsof the Warren Bridge.1' We are
fortunate in having a major study of that case in Stanley Kutler's Privilege
and Creative Destruction,4 in which the author makes clear that the case
involved extremely important questions of public policy regarding the promotion of productive enterprise. Indeed, Professor Freund's foreword to the
Swisher book shows a deeper understanding of the case than do Swisher's
30 pages. Professor Freund writes:
Property was not subordinated; rather, it was seen that two kinds
of property interests were generally in conflict: those already secured and those reflecting new and competing enterprise. The
contest was not so much over the vindication of property rights as

over the conflict between the security of acquisitions and the security of transactions (pp. xv-xvi).
This is enormously subtle and acute. Swisher's banal conclusion, in which

he attempts to move away from the "Jacksonian versus Whig" interpretation
that pervaded the preceding chapter (pp. 90-93), provides an instructive
contrast:
If perchance announcement of the rule worked hardships as to
grants previously made, it induced future applicants for corporate
13. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
14. S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATVE

DESTRUCION

(1971).
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privileges to specify more clearly the scope of the privileges sought.
It protected the public against inadvertent loss of property and
against privileges not clearly intended to be given. For all the distress of the critics of the decision, it would seem ultimately to have
been salutary (p. 97).
As a final note, it is interesting that Swisher abandons the political
approach in the final sixth of the book, dealing with the Court during the
Civil War. As Swisher recognizes, this is partly the result of an unfortunate
periodization (p. 961). During the Civil War, the primary arena of
constitutional development lay in the other branches of government. 15 But
Swisher's failure to impose a political interpretation on the Civil War
material also shows that, as in the earlier portions of the work, his categories
of nationalism and states' rights will not capture even the political dimensions
of the conflict. 16
Taken as a whole, the present volume is disappointing. Its strengths,
while real, are not enough to sustain it through the banality of the political
interpretations that Swisher offers and the parochialism of his emphasis on
politics. Hopefully, we may still look forward to the remaining volumes of
the Holmes Devise History, which will be published under the names of such
sophisticated scholars as George Haskins, Gerald Gunther, Alexander Bickel
and Professor Freund himself. It is unfortunate that Professor Freund did
not lend the full measure of his sophistication to this volume.
15.

See H.

HYMAN,

A MORE

PERFECT UNION

(1973).

16. One senses that for Swisher, the conflicts between these viewpoints were properly
resolved by the Civil War in favor of nationalism.

